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 Is There Such a Thing as 
a ‘Pragmatic Sociology of Critique’? 





(Translated by Simon Susen) 
 
In the contemporary sociological literature, not only in the Francophone2 world 
but also in Germanophone3 and Anglophone4 contexts, the work of Luc Boltanski 
is widely recognized as a major contribution to the social sciences. The value and 
influence of Boltanski’s writings manifest themselves in the emergence of a new 
paradigm: the sociology of critique or, as it has been recently characterized not only 
by sympathetic and unsympathetic critics alike but also by the author himself, the 
pragmatic sociology of critique.5 It is true that the concept of critique plays a pivotal 
role in most of Boltanski’s writings.6 His recent book On Critique7 is particularly 
important in this regard, since it is symptomatic of the author’s attempt to 
explain both the place and the function that discursive processes occupy within 
the sociological approach that he has developed over the past decades. 
From a terminological point of view, the Boltanskian paradigm is based 
on three key concepts: ‘sociology’, ‘pragmatic’, and ‘critique’. Given their 
centrality, it makes sense to reflect on the meaning attached to them in 
Boltanski’s work. 
The first term – ‘sociology’ – reminds us of the fact that, whilst the 
intellectual currents that have influenced Boltanski’s approach are diverse, 
and although the scope of his writings transcends disciplinary boundaries, 
his oeuvre is embedded mainly in one specific field of research: empirical 
sociology. Neighbouring disciplines – such as philosophy, anthropology, 
history, linguistics, economics, and political science – have certainly inspired 
the Boltanskian project for some time, just as these disciplines have begun  
to draw upon Boltanskian insights. To the extent that the epistemological 
underpinnings of his work  are firmly situated in the field of  sociological 
  
 
studies, Boltanski’s writings express an unambiguous concern with ‘the nature 
of the social’ – that is, with the phenomena and forces that shape, or depend 
upon, both the constitution and the evolution of human relations. Thus, for 
Boltanski, the role of critique needs to be studied in terms of its intersubjective 
character: to the extent that the act of criticizing constitutes an integral element 
of human life, the task of the pragmatic sociologist consists in shedding light 
on both the social nature and the social functions of critique. 
The second term – ‘pragmatic’ – indicates that, even if Boltanski’s sociological 
writings contain strong theoretical dimensions informed by highly refined 
conceptual tools and philosophical presuppositions, they are based on the 
conviction that an essential task of sociology consists in studying human practices: 
to the extent that society cannot exist without people’s daily accomplishments, 
sociology needs to engage in the systematic study of their actions. Doing 
sociology without examining ordinary practices would be tantamount to 
living in society without immersing oneself in the universe of human actions. 
Perhaps the most important consequence of this methodological position is to 
be found in Boltanski’s categorical imperative according to which people need to 
be taken seriously. Hence, instead of constructing a praxeological gap between 
‘laypersons’ and ‘experts’, epitomized in the creation of an epistemological 
hierarchy between ‘illusory knowledge’ and ‘enlightened knowledge’, a chief 
objective of pragmatic sociology is to deconstruct the fatalistic opposition 
between ‘the doxic world of ordinary people’ and ‘the scientific world of 
enlightened thinkers’. For this permits us to reconstruct the socio-ontological 
unity of human beings, thereby doing justice to the pragmatic force that 
derives from a set of anthropological competences, whose existence transcends 
the social divisions permeating everyday life. Pragmatic sociology accounts 
not only for the specificity and plurality of human practices but also, in a 
more fundamental sense, for the universal role played by quotidian actions, 
illustrating the fact that we are all ordinary people.8 
The third term – ‘critique’ – is vital to the Boltanskian view that the 
social researcher needs to study the  human  world  as  both  an  objective 
and a normative realm of interactions. In other words, we have to explore  
the implications of the fact that all spaces of human sociality are shaped, 
simultaneously, by the normativity of values and by the objectivity of facts. 
In essence, critique can be regarded as a reflexive force that permits us to 
distance ourselves from three worlds of experience: ‘the’ external world 
(objective realm), ‘our’ external world (normative realm), and ‘my’ internal 
world (subjective realm). From this perspective, human subjects are conceived 
of as actors capable of mobilizing their cognitive resources, which permit them 
to distance themselves, reflexively, from the immediacy of their lifeworlds. 
Although other concepts  –  such as ‘justification’ (justification), ‘city’ (cité), ‘order 
  
 
of worth’ (grandeur), ‘test’ (épreuve), ‘generalization’ (montée en généralité), ‘world’ 
(monde), and ‘reality’ (réalité) – also play a pivotal role in Boltanski’s oeuvre, and 
whilst we need to resist the temptation to reduce his approach to a unified, 
let alone monolithic, programme, it is worth pointing out that the concept of 
critique constitutes a cornerstone of Boltanskian analysis. The major significance 
that Boltanski attributes to this concept is based on the following assumption: 
the main reason why the social world is shaped by permanent negotiation 
concerning the validity of established norms is the existence of people’s critical 
capacities. Owing to the ineluctable criticizability of social arrangements, 
nothing is more contingent and more contestable than human relations. 
Tautologically speaking, nothing is more contingent and more contestable 
than historical contingency and practical contestability themselves. Therefore, 
a key challenge for pragmatic sociology consists in deciphering the multiple 
codes and contents of the most ordinary forms of criticism. If critical capacity 
constitutes a universal competence of human beings, rather than a professional 
privilege of social researchers, then the epistemic process of uncovering needs 
to be recognized as an everyday activity performed by ordinary people who 
are involved in the construction of the reality in which they find themselves 
situated, rather than by experts who seek to explain the world by detaching 
themselves from it. Put differently, critique exists always already amongst the 
criticized. 
In short, the Boltanskian endeavour can be described as a pragmatic 
sociology of critique. As such, it is committed to studying society sociologically, 
pragmatically, and critically: 
 
(a) As a sociological approach, it is concerned with the systematic investigation 
of the nature of the social. Hence, it seeks to analyse the modern world, 
above all, in terms of the constitution and evolution of social relations. 
(b) As a pragmatic approach, it is concerned with the meticulous examination 
of the nature of social practices. Highlighting the existential significance of 
people’s quotidian activities, it scrutinizes the construction of the human 
world by focusing on actors’ concrete and ordinary practices, including the 
functional differentiation of their social roles. 
(c) As a critical approach, it is concerned with the in-depth exploration of ordinary 
people’s reflexive practices. In this sense, it would be fair to assert that what lies at 
the heart of the Boltanskian project is a profoundly normative preoccupation, 
which is illustrated by the fact that it draws our attention to the social nature and 
the social functions of critique in general and of ordinary people’s critical capacity 
in particular. In brief, Boltanskian thought is based on three cornerstones: the 
sociological reflection upon human relations, the pragmatic interest in human 
activities, and the normative enquiry into the potential of human critique. 
  
 
In light of the above, we may suggest that the most fundamental presupposition 
underlying Boltanskian thought is the conviction that society is the ensemble of practical 
and criticizable relations established between human actors. Guided by this assumption, the 
main task of Boltanskian sociology consists in studying the multiple ways in which 
social relations, everyday practices, and ordinary criticisms are fundamental to the 
construction of human life forms. Such an endeavour permits us to demonstrate 
that human beings, owing to their critical capacity, are not only able to reinforce 
but also able to undermine the legitimacy of different regimes of normativity, 
which they encounter in their everyday activities. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the importance of the 
three aforementioned features by examining one of Boltanski’s most recent 
books: On Critique.9 To be exact, the central questions that emerge in the light 
of the detailed examination of this work can be summarized as follows. 
 
(I) What are the most substantial contributions of critical theory10 to the 
problematization of social life? 
(II) What are the main functions of institutions11 with regard to the construction 
of social life? 
(III) What role does critique12 play in the legitimization of social life? 
(IV) What is the power of domination13 in relation to the reproduction of social 
life? 
(V) What is the potential of emancipation14 with regard to the transformation 
of social life? 
 
The following five sections are an attempt to respond to these questions. The 
final section examines some significant weaknesses and limitations of Boltanskian 
thought. In addition, we shall briefly address a sixth question: to what extent 
does the reconciliation15 between Pierre Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and 
Luc Boltanski’s ‘sociology of critique’ permit us to develop an alternative 
theoretical framework capable of doing justice to the complexity of social life? 
 
 
I. The Task of Critical Theory: 
The Problematization of Social Life 
Here we shall examine ‘[t]he structure of critical theories’,16 starting from 
the assumption that, despite the important discrepancies between diverse 
traditions and approaches associated with critical thought, all critical theories, 
and notably critical sociologies, share a fundamental concern regarding the 
concept of social domination.17 What is even more important, however, is the fact 
that they seek to comprehend the reality of social domination; that is, they aim 
  
 
to identify the causes, symptoms, and consequences of power relations within 
concrete historical contexts.18 In order to grasp the complexity of this task, it is 
necessary to examine the concept of critical theory on various levels. 
First, we need to draw a distinction between the concept of ‘power’ and the concept 
of ‘domination’. In the most general sense, the former designates the capacity 
to do something, whereas the latter describes the capacity to impose oneself 
upon another entity – that is, upon an individual or collective actor – with 
the aim of making them do something in a particular way.19 In German, the 
meaning of this analytical distinction manifests itself in the semantic difference 
between the term Macht and the term Herrschaft: the former concerns, literally, 
the ability to ‘do something’ (machen); the latter refers to the ability to ‘control’ 
(beherrschen) the actions undertaken by a person, or by a group of persons, in 
such a way that the material or symbolic nature of their existence – either in 
its totality or in relation to a specific behavioural or cognitive aspect – turns 
out to be determined by an exogenous force. What is crucial within the 
framework of the present analysis is the fact that the conceptual distinction 
between ‘power’ and ‘domination’ obliges us to reflect upon the paradigmatic 
difference between Bourdieu’s ‘critical sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic 
sociology of critique’.20 
From a Boltanskian perspective, ‘[t]he fact of exercising power or of being 
subjected to power does not escape the consciousness of actors’,21 in the sense that – and 
this has major epistemological implications – ‘power relations are invariably 
visible to the eyes of an observer’.22 In light of this perceptibility of power, the 
sociologist of critique seeks to demonstrate that not only expert observers, on 
the basis of their clinical and distant objectification of behavioural patterns, 
but also ordinary actors, on the basis of their ability to call social phenomena 
and the environment in which they emerge into  question,  are  equipped 
with the capacity to convert their complicity with power into an exercise of 
reflection upon power. Put differently, the need to mobilize power cannot be 
dissociated from the need to justify its existence.23 In Boltanskian terms, it is 
‘[b]ecause it must be both asserted and justified’24 that ‘power speaks of power’.25 
By contrast, from a Bourdieusian perspective, actors establish a largely 
unconscious relation with power in general and with domination in particular. On 
this view, power ‘is not only not directly observable, but also invariably eludes 
the consciousness of actors’.26 As a consequence, the two principal tasks of 
critical sociology consist in deciphering the tangible symptoms and consequences 
of domination and in uncovering the underlying causes and mechanisms of 
power relations. The categorical imperative of Bourdieusian sociology, then, 
can be synthesized as follows: ‘Domination must be unmasked.’27 In light of 
the invisible and impenetrable constitution of the structural determinants 
underlying processes of social domination,  it is essential to recognize that the 
  
 
normative ambition to make judgements about power cannot be dissociated from 
the explanatory mission to uncover its inner workings. Yet, according to Bourdieu, 
the normative act of making judgements and the explanatory act of uncovering 
hidden mechanisms remain an epistemological privilege of expert observers, 
whose study of the world is guided by scientific tools, which inform their reflexive 
attitude, rather than of ordinary actors, whose understanding of the world is 
governed by doxic illusions, which permeate their common sense. It is because 
it must be both concealed and dissimulated that power never speaks of power.28 
Considering not only the analytical distinction between ‘power’ and 
‘domination’, but also the paradigmatic separation between ‘critical 
sociology’ and ‘sociology of critique’, as well as the epistemological 
differentiation between ‘scientific knowledge’ and ‘ordinary knowledge’, it is vital to 
reflect upon the ontological status of the intrinsic relation between morality, critique, 
and reflexivity.29 The path from Dilthey via Husserl to Boltanski is not long, 
given that all three thinkers insist upon the fact that the ontological difference 
between the natural world and the cultural world is reflected in the 
methodological separation between the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaften) and the social and human sciences (Sozial- und 
Geisteswissenschaften).30 
To be precise, the bifurcation between the natural sciences and the social 
sciences is justified on the basis of the assumption that the human world 
distinguishes itself from the rest of the universe in that, due to people’s reflexive 
capacity, social reality is not only interpreted but also organized in accordance 
with the moral and critical judgements of its inhabitants. 
 
[H]uman beings are not content to act or react to the actions of others. They 
review their own actions or those of others in order to make judgements on [sic] 
them, often hinging on the issue of good and evil – that is, moral judgements. This 
reflexive capacity means that they also react to the representations given of their 
properties or actions, including when the latter derive from sociology or critical 
theories.31 
 
According to this perspective, ‘[m]oral activity is a predominantly critical 
activity’,32 because it requires individuals to take normative positions on a 
collective reality and – which is even more significant – because it requires 
them to act normatively – that is, in relation to the values and convictions 
existing within their shared world. The legitimacy of different mechanisms of 
socialization is sustained on the basis of multiple processes of justification. 
The Boltanskian assumption that people’s reflexive and moral capacities are 
built into the human condition has four important philosophical implications.   
The  first  implication  is  that,  in accordance  with  the  Kantian  tradition, 
it  is  important  to  recognize that the natural world and the social world33 are two 
  
 
fundamentally different spheres of being. This difference is due to the fact 
that, whereas the former constitutes a physical and objective space composed 
of an ensemble of things and non-reflexive creatures, the latter represents a 
cultural and normative space constructed by reflexive entities equipped with 
moral and critical capacities. In other words, the ontological difference between 
the natural world and the social world emanates from incommensurable 
features inherent in each of these two realms of existence. 
The second implication is that, in accordance with the Diltheyan tradition, 
it is vital to acknowledge that the natural sciences and the social sciences34 are two 
fundamentally different endeavours. They diverge in that their objects of 
study are essentially dissimilar: the natural world, which is composed of non- 
conscious entities, and the cultural world, which is constructed by creatures that 
are conscious not only of their environment but also of their existence. If the 
world of human beings is a realm constructed by creatures capable of attributing 
meaning to their existence, the methods used to explain the explicable, or the 
inexplicable, within the objective world cannot be the same as the methods 
employed to comprehend the comprehensible, or the incomprehensible,  
within the normative world. To the extent that human beings are at the same 
time objective, normative, and subjective entities, and to the extent that their 
existence presupposes their simultaneous immersion in natural, social, and 
personal realms, the Menschsein (being-human) is a combination of Dasein (being- 
there), Miteinandersein (being-with-one-another), and Alleinsein (being-alone). 
Regardless of the specific disciplinary – that is, philosophical, sociological, 
anthropological, or psychological – approach we may use in order to analyse 
the functioning of the human world, we cannot suspend our attachment to 
these three foundational realms of existence. Notwithstanding the question of 
how we make sense of our tripartite immersion in the universe, the methodological 
difference between the natural sciences and the social sciences stems from the 
ontological difference between the natural world and the social world.35 
The third implication is that, contrary to the Weberian tradition, it is 
necessary to accept that the distinction between facts and values36 expresses a 
fluid relation, rather than a clear-cut difference, in the sense that the human 
world constitutes an existential realm pervaded by both the objective force of 
factuality and the normative force of validity. Undoubtedly, the separation 
between facts and values designates a legitimate distinction in that constative 
statements are aimed at representing an objective existence, which ‘is there’, 
whereas normative statements refer to a prescriptive existence, which ‘should be 
there’ – that is, which is located within reality as it is deliberately constructed 
and consciously experienced by human agents. We must not forget, however, 
that factuality and normativity are inextricably linked. They constitute two 
cornerstones of all forms of sociality: social facts are impregnated with social 
  
 
norms, because everything that ‘is’ within the world of collective construction 
needs to be consolidated through processes of normalization; at the same 
time, social norms are impregnated with social facts, because everything that 
‘should be’ within the world of normative actualization needs to be confirmed 
by processes of objective realization. Hence, the pragmatic unity between 
facts and values is based on the inherent relationship between factuality and 
normativity, which lies at the heart of all forms of sociality. 
The fourth and last implication is that, contrary to the Bourdieusian 
tradition, it is necessary to question the opposition between ordinary knowledge 
and scientific knowledge.37 This epistemological separation enables us to understand 
two divergent types of knowledge. On the one hand, the doxic sense is a mode 
of interpretation produced through direct and participatory experience of the 
world; it is constructed in accordance with the way in which the world ‘appears’ 
to actors and is ‘understood’ by them. On the other hand, the scientific sense is 
a mode of interpretation founded  on  critical  and  reflexive knowledge about 
the world; it is developed in accordance with the mode of ‘being’ of the world 
and the mode of ‘explanation’ privileged by experts. In real life, however, the 
difference between these two forms of knowledge is blurred. We are dealing with 
a contingent distinction to the extent that the human world constitutes a realm 
determined – simultaneously – by  the  force  of ‘taken-for-grantedness’, which 
is central to the habitual rhythm of everyday interactions, and by the force of 
‘questioning’, which derives from the contemplative spirit of thoughtful reflection. 
Yet, the doxic knowledge of common sense is impregnated with the critical 
knowledge of scientific thinking: everything that ‘appears’ right or wrong to actors 
is subject to implicit or explicit tests undertaken by actors. Analogously, the critical 
knowledge of experts is permeated by the doxic knowledge of common sense: 
everything that ‘is’ right or correct according to scientific analysis is subject to 
implicit or explicit preconceptions acquired by people, who are situated within 
socio-historical horizons. In conclusion, the epistemological unity between ordinary 
knowledge and scientific knowledge is due to the fact that quotidian reflexivity 
represents an integral component of the mediated construction of human sociality. 
The first two implications – concerning the ontological difference between 
the natural world and the social world, as well as the methodological difference 
between the natural sciences and the social sciences – demonstrate that 
Boltanskian thought, in accordance with the Kantian and Diltheyan 
traditions, is motivated by the conviction that it is essential to shed light on 
the distinctiveness of the human condition. On this view, we need to recognize that 
human beings raise themselves above nature on the basis of their species- 
distinctive characteristics, notably their reflexive capacity, which permits them 
to make moral judgements and to negotiate social norms. The last two 
implications  –  concerning the pragmatic unity between facts and values, 
  
 
as well as the epistemological unity between ordinary knowledge and expert 
knowledge – illustrate that Boltanskian thought, contrary to the Weberian and 
Bourdieusian traditions, is based on the assumption that it is crucial to account 
for the distinctiveness of human cognitive competences. According to this perspective, 
we need to acknowledge that human beings are able to coordinate their actions 
on the basis of their cognitive faculties, especially their normative capacity, which 
allows them to make critical judgements and to codify their pragmatic contexts 
of interaction. Put differently, reflexive capacity and normative capacity can 
be regarded as ontological cornerstones of the Boltanskian anthropology of 
practice. 
Having considered the aforementioned – ontological, methodological, 
pragmatic, and epistemological – implications, it is possible to turn our 
attention to three distinctions that are situated at the core of the Boltanskian 
conception of critique: the distinction between ‘ordinary criticisms’ and ‘metacritical 
positions’,38 the distinction between ‘simple exteriority’ and ‘complex exteriority’,39 and 
the distinction between ‘domination’ and ‘exploitation’.40 
The first distinction, Boltanski claims, ‘is maintained between the partial 
critiques developed by the actors on  the  basis  of  their  experiences  and 
the systematic critique of a particular social order’.41 Hence, we need to 
differentiate between the criticisms raised by ordinary actors within practical 
contexts and the criticisms formulated by thinkers within theoretical frameworks. 
The former manifest themselves in ‘these socially rooted, contextual forms 
of criticism’,42 which emerge in ordinary situations; the latter are mobilized 
within ‘theoretical constructions that aim to unmask, in their most general 
dimensions, oppression, exploitation or domination’.43 In short, we can 
distinguish between practical criticisms and theoretical criticisms. 
The second distinction concerns the difference between ‘the sociological 
operation of  describing of  society’44 and ‘the critical operation addressed   
to a social order’.45 The descriptive operation is motivated by the objective 
representation of things ‘as they are’, thereby constituting a ‘simple exteriority’.46 
The normative operation, by contrast, is impregnated with value judgements 
and with an interpretation of  things ‘as they could be’, thereby alluding      
to a ‘complex exteriority’.47 The term ‘exteriority’ suggests that, in both cases, 
the point of  reference is an external reality,  which is ‘out there’ and which  
is composed of ‘constraints that are independent of the observer’s will’.48 
Yet, whereas the objective description of reality involves a simplification of 
exteriority, the prescriptive critique of reality implies a complexification of 
exteriority. The explorative realization of the second task, a normative 
undertaking oriented towards a complex exteriority, is impossible without  
the preliminary accomplishment of the first task, a descriptive act in relation 
to a simple exteriority. If, in other words, ‘[a] metacritical theory is in fact 
  
 
necessarily reliant on a descriptive sociology or anthropology’,49 we are obliged 
to distinguish between the objective representation of a simple exteriority and 
the normative problematization of a complex exteriority. 
The third distinction concerns a  terminological  dimension  that  is  not 
an obvious one in critical thought: the differentiation between ‘domination’50 
and ‘exploitation’.51 Metacritical theories that are based on the systematic 
problematization of a complex exteriority ‘are often combined with theories 
of exploitation’.52 To the extent that ‘[t]he term exploitation has an economic 
orientation’,53 the term domination has ‘rather (if I can put it like this) a 
semantic one’.54 Social domination rarely functions as a set of power relations 
exclusively determined by material and economic constraints: in most cases, 
it imposes itself – often in remarkably efficient and invasive ways – through 
the articulation between ‘symbolic forms and states of affairs’.55 To the extent 
that every life form generates its own language games,56 every economic 
mode of production creates its own ideological mode of signification.57 The 
interdependence between ‘the material’ and ‘the symbolic’ – within systems 
of social organization in general and within systems of social domination in 
particular – demonstrates that ‘the economic realm’ and ‘the semantic realm’ 
constitute two inseparable spheres of human life. To be sure, ‘the field of the 
determination of what is’58 – that is, of what is possible – depends on its material 
and symbolic realization – that is, of what is constructible. Therefore, critical 
theory needs to examine both the semantic power of economic dimensions 
and the economic value of semantic dimensions, in order to make sense of 
the material and the symbolic dimensions underlying hegemonic regimes of 
action. 
 
II. The Function of Institutions: 
The Construction of Social Life 
The ‘power of institutions’59 stems from their omnipresence in social life. At 
the heart of the Boltanskian conception of institutions lies the distinction 
between  ‘metacritical  theories’60  and  ‘ordinary  critiques’.61  Developing 
the Boltanskian terminology further, we can suggest that this conceptual 
differentiation is based on the analytical distinction between (a) ‘metacritical 
theories’ and ‘metacritical practices’, (b) ‘theoretical criticisms’ and ‘practical criticisms’, 
and (c) ‘transcendental engagements’ and ‘immanent engagements’. 
The first level concerns the epistemological difference between, on the one 
hand, critical knowledge developed and defended by researchers and, on the 
other hand, critical knowledge produced and mobilized by ordinary people. The 
former is founded on the objectification of reality by social science – that is, 
‘from a position of exteriority’,62     epitomized in the role of objectifying experts. 
  
 
The latter is based on the questioning of reality by those who construct it – that 
is, it is created ‘from within by actors involved in disputes’.63 
The second level concerns the methodological difference between, on the 
one hand, theoretical criticism, which is articulated by virtue of conceptual and 
paradigmatic frameworks, and, on the other hand, practical criticism, which is 
firmly situated in the realm of empirical regimes of action. The former is 
formulated by theoreticians, who aim to provide different models of explanation 
and who ‘unmask and challenge’64 the legitimacy of reality. The latter is 
undertaken ‘by actors involved in disputes’65 and is embedded in ‘sequences 
of critique and justification, of highly variable levels of generality’,66 without 
which the normative construction of society cannot take place. 
The third level concerns the socio-ontological difference between, on the 
one hand, theoretical distancing on the basis of ‘overarching sociological 
descriptions and normative stances’67 on society, and, on the other hand, 
practical immersion by means of direct experiences and discursive articulations 
in society. The former demonstrates that the sociologists’ raison d’être consists 
in their ability to position themselves outside society by distancing themselves 
from the arrangements of reality. The latter indicates that the critical actors’ 
raison d’être consists in their ability to position themselves within society by 
constructing the conditions of reality. 
Thus, in order to shed light on the difference between ‘metacritical theories’ 
and ‘ordinary criticisms’, it is useful to draw three analytical distinctions: 
epistemologically, between exteriority and interiority; methodologically, between 
explanation and justification; and, socio-ontologically, between distancing and 
immersion. Bourdieusian sociology is strongly associated with the analytical 
levels of exteriority, explanation, and distancing. By contrast, Boltanskian sociology 
tends to give priority to the analytical levels of interiority, justification, and 
immersion. 
The Bourdieusian approach aims to defend the alleged superiority of 
scientific knowledge, as opposed to doxic knowledge, by drawing upon a 
position of objective exteriority. Moreover, its unmasking ambition consists in 
uncovering the underlying mechanisms of reality and in contributing to the 
explanation of the causal forces that determine both the constitution and the 
evolution of society. Lastly, it presupposes that the explanation of reality from 
the vantage point of exteriority enables sociologists to distance themselves 
from their doxic immersion and submerge themselves in the reflective exercise 
of critical distance-taking, with the aim of objectifying the contradictory 
constitution of practical reality. 
The Boltanskian approach, by contrast, seeks to study the reflexivity 
underlying processes of ordinary knowledge acquisition, which takes place 
from  a  position  of  normative  interiority.   Furthermore,  its reconstructive 
  
 
ambition consists in understanding the discursive dynamics of multiple regimes 
of action, which are sustained by different modes of justification. Finally, it is 
motivated by the conviction that the understanding of reality from the point 
of view of interiority permits sociologists to break with the scientistic illusion 
of pure objectification and to produce critical knowledge through immersion in 
different regimes of action. 
In search of ‘institutions’,68 the Boltanskian perspective centres upon the 
sociological significance of interiority, justification, and immersion. On this 
account, social actors exist inevitably within institutions and are regularly 
confronted with the need to justify their relation to these institutions, whilst 
their participation within different regimes of action is unthinkable without 
their immersion within different forms of institution. 
Despite the fact that ‘the concept of institution is one of the […]  
founding concepts’69 of sociology, and although the reality of institutions 
may be regarded as the foundational institution of reality, the pivotal role it 
plays in the construction of social reality is, according to Boltanski, largely 
underestimated. The central force of institutions in social life is rooted in their 
capacity to transform reality into a materially and symbolically structured 
world. In this sense, ‘the institutional’ and ‘the social’ can be conceived of  
as two equivalent aspects of reality: it is because societies are institutionally 
consolidated and because institutions are socially naturalized that the reality 
of the world is structured and the world of reality remains unnoticed. What 
distinguishes ‘social facts’ from ‘natural facts’ is that they are not only ‘given’ 
but also ‘instituted’.70 Social reality is inconceivable without the ensemble of 
instituted facts. 
The reflection on the instituted and instituting constitution of society 
touches upon a fundamental distinction through which Boltanskian thought 
aims to make sense of the profound ‘uncertainty’71 that permeates human 
life, illustrating that human actors cannot escape the ambiguity of their 
attachment to a double – that is, both objective and normative – exteriority: 
human beings are situated, at once, in an external existence ‘as it is’ and in 
an external existence ‘as it is constructed’. We are, then, faced with a twofold 
exteriority, whose complexity is captured in Boltanski’s distinction between 
‘world’ and ‘reality’.72 
In the most general sense, we can say that the world is ‘everything that   
is the case’73 and reality encompasses ‘everything that is constructed’.74 Put 
differently, the world is ‘everything that happens to people’, and reality is 
‘everything that is constructed by people’. The world exists beyond our will and 
regardless of our intentions, whereas reality exists through our will and because 
of our intentions. The Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,75 with whose complexity 
Schopenhauer grapples in his writings, is the reality of a realized and realizable 
  
 
world, which lies at the core of Boltanski’s reflections. As sociologists, we need 
to recognize the preponderance of reality over the world, which characterizes 
every society within the world. As social entities, we have learned to establish 
a relation to the world by forming relations with others – that is, by developing 
a relation with social reality. This does not mean, however, that the world does 
not exercise power over reality. On the contrary, ‘[t]he power exercised by 
the world over reality stems precisely from the fact that the world is subject 
to incessant changes, which are far from being exclusively “social” in kind’,76 
but which are also ‘natural’ in the sense that we are embodied beings situated 
within a physical world. As human beings, we are condemned to search for 
our place in the world, somewhere between the realm of objectivity and the 
realm of normativity, but without ever being able to find it. 
If we accept that ‘[a]n institution is a bodiless being to which is delegated 
the task of stating the whatness of what is’,77 it appears justified to suggest that 
it is ‘first of all in its semantic functions that the institution must be considered’.78 
Taking into account their semantic functions, it is possible to understand the 
double – that is, simultaneously material and symbolic – power of institutions. Their 
symbolic power permits them to determine the vocabulary mobilized by 
members of society when attributing meaning to reality. Their material power 
equips them with the capacity to structure the grammars underlying different 
regimes of action, which set the parameters for specific performative operations. 
Far from conceiving of this semantic function as an omnipotent force that 
eliminates the potential autonomy of  acting subjects, and far from endorsing 
a fatalistic view of the world that fails to do justice to the anthropological 
significance of people’s critical and transformative capacities, it is necessary to 
shift from ‘the critique of necessity’ to ‘the necessity of critique’.79 For such a 
paradigm shift is the first step towards understanding why every society is an 
ensemble of interminable ‘sought-to-be-realized’ projects. 
 
III. The Role of Critique: 
The Legitimization of Social Life 
From a Boltanskian point of view, ‘the uncertainty that permeates social life’80 is 
characterized  by  the  dialectic  between  two  registers  of  action:  a  ‘practical 
register’,81 whose level of reflexivity is rather weak and rudimentary, and a 
‘metapragmatic register’,82 whose level of reflexivity is more elevated and 
differentiated. The first level is marked by ‘a certain tolerance for 
differences’83 and sustained by the existence of a set of codified 
arrangements  that  guarantee  the  reproduction  of  society.  The  second 
level is characterized  by  the  implicit  or  explicit  reference  to  the  
necessity of critique and founded on  two metapragmatic forces: 
confirmation and justification.84 Put differently, the socio-ontological dialectic 
  
 
between the ‘practical register’ and the ‘metapragmatic register’ is crucial to 
the praxeological interplay between intuitive immersion and reflexive distancing; 
and the socio-ontological dialectic between the ‘metapragmatic register of 
affirmation’ and the ‘metapragmatic register of legitimization’ lies at the 
centre of the normative rivalry between the immanent force of confirmation 
and the transcendent force of justification. 
One of Boltanski’s main ambitions is to shed light on ‘the indispensable 
role played by critique in social life that explains the importance sociology 
has always accorded it’.85 From this angle, critique does not represent a 
peripheral or ephemeral element of everyday reality. On the contrary, it 
constitutes a driving force of human coexistence, capable of questioning the 
commonly accepted assumptions without which the normative codification 
of society would not be possible. Critique, as a transformative force of our 
socio-ontological condition, is hidden behind two sources of existential 
ambivalence, which manifest themselves within two ‘hermeneutic contradictions’:86 
the former derives from the fact that institutions ‘are at once necessary and 
fragile, beneficial and abusive’,87 and thus marked by the tensions between 
solidity and fragility, necessity and impossibility, docility and hostility, positivity 
and negativity; the latter is due to the tension between ‘semantics and 
pragmatics’,88 which lies at the heart of our socio-ontological condition and 
which demonstrates that, ultimately, the conversion of the world into reality 
is inconceivable without ‘the articulation between the bodiless being of the 
institution and the corporeal being’.89 In other words, the possibility of social 
criticism indicates that, despite their capacity to impose themselves upon and 
consolidate themselves within reality, institutions can be problematized and 
transformed by those actors who are prepared to call their legitimacy into 
question. Moreover, the possibility of social criticism highlights that, whilst 
institutions are disembodied and seemingly disinterested, the capacity to 
attribute meaning to corporeal experiences remains a privilege of embodied 
and interested entities, situated not only in the world but also in reality. 
To the extent that we are confronted with ‘a radical separation between 
the pure will of the bodiless being and the wills embodied in the corporeal 
person’,90 we need to accept that the disembodied intentions of institutions 
derive from the embodied intentions of  persons. A being without a body is  
a body without being.  Institutions succeed in imposing their construction    
of reality on society by exercising both soft and hidden forms of violence: 
‘violence is tacitly present in institutions because they must struggle against 
the unmasking of [the] hermeneutic contradiction’.91 An efficient institution, 
then, is a consolidated assemblage that succeeds in concealing the violent 
character of its own reality by creating mechanisms of confirmation that 
escape the critical force of validity tests. 
  
 
‘Confirmation and critique become meaningful only when conceived in 
their dialogical relationship.’92 The power of critique can be confirmed only 
by criticizing the power of confirmation, just as the power of confirmation can 
be criticized only by confirming the power of critique. Regardless of the type 
of test (épreuve) undertaken in order to question the codes established within 
a given reality, the necessity of critique presupposes the critique of necessity, 
without which there is no emancipatory transformation of reality. Truth tests 
(épreuves de vérité) are ‘symbolic’ in the sense that, on the basis of interpretations, 
they aim to understand ‘a universe of signs’93 shared by a community. Reality 
tests (épreuves de réalité) are ‘material’ in the sense that, by means of actions, 
they seek to uncover ‘the powers concealed’94 within society. Existential tests 
(épreuves existentielles) are ‘experienced’ in the sense that they face up to ‘the 
incompleteness of reality and even its contingency, by drawing examples 
from the flux of life’95 and by exposing manifestations of the fundamental 
ambiguity pervading all social constructions, which, in their totality, form the 
ensemble of reality.96 
 
IV. The Power of Domination: 
The Reproduction of Social Life 
In order to understand the logic underlying political regimes of domination, 
it is important to remember that no system of  power can bypass the need    
to incorporate the hermeneutic contradiction97 resulting from the tension between 
solidity and fragility inherent in every society. 
 
In effect, […] no political regime can completely avoid the risk of critique, which is 
in a sense incorporated, in different forms, in [the] hermeneutic contradiction.98 
 
Put differently, to the extent that the hermeneutic contradiction is 
fundamental to every political regime, the transformative force of  critique  
is situated at the heart of every socio-ontological condition. The ‘circulation 
between confirmation and critique’99 – or, if one prefers, ‘the articulation of 
institutional power and critique’100 – is a sign of the fact that the search for 
logical coherence, supposedly underlying our sociological immanence, is a 
source of metaphysical illusion, driven by the futile attempt to escape from the 
empirical constraints imposed by our physical condition. 
 
For it is part and parcel of the normal course of social life that it is only very 
partially coherent and yet, despite everything, that it enables the coexistence of 
beings whose differences and divergences are always stronger than what they can 
unite around, albeit only sometimes.101 
  
 
In the face of the ontological uncertainty that permeates the practical 
constitution of every historical formation, ‘the maniacal quest for coherence’102 – not 
only pursued by experts and researchers, but also by ordinary people in their 
lifeworlds – can never get rid of the socio-ontological preponderance of contingency. 
Notwithstanding the specificity of the political regimes of domination in 
which we find ourselves situated, the force of critique stems from the capacity 
to exploit the contingency that is built into the appearance of coherence, 
thereby imbuing all forms of immanence with the potential for transcendence. 
It is only by recognizing that critique occupies a central position in the 
architecture of the social that it becomes possible to understand that political 
regimes differ from one another not only in terms of their administrative, 
territorial, economic, demographic, military, or ideological organization. In 
addition, the typological specificity of a political regime depends on the place 
it affords critique in the face of the dialectical interplay between confirmation 
and justification. In other words, to the extent that ‘different political regimes 
are distinguished by the role they accord critique in the face of the power of 
institutions’,103 every mode of confirmation generates its own mode of justification. If the 
mode of confirmation succeeds in determining the mode of justification that is 
put in place in order to ensure its own reproduction, then critique is reduced 
to playing an immanent role whose function is to regulate and correct, rather 
than to undermine and transform,  the  social  assemblage  that  constitutes 
the ensemble of arrangements created by human actors. By contrast, if the 
mode of justification succeeds in determining the mode of confirmation that is 
established in order to define the limits of a particular realm of socialization, 
then critique is elevated to playing a transcendent role whose function is to invent 
and realize, rather than to consolidate and legitimize, the social assemblage 
that provides a coexistential space for the ensemble of projects pursued by 
human actors. The projective investment and the reflexive engagement 
within a collective arrangement serve as ontological resources of historical 
developments determined by the force of critique. 
In order to understand the constitution and the functioning of a specific 
political regime of domination, it is essential to examine its capacity to 
incorporate the force of critique with the aim of guaranteeing its own 
legitimacy. Simplifying the complexity of reality, and thus imposing a 
typological coherence upon socio-ontological contingence, it is – following 
Boltanski – possible to distinguish two principal forms of social domination: 
‘simple domination’104 and ‘complex domination’,105 or – put differently – ‘primitive 
domination’106 and ‘managerial domination’.107 The former represents a  
mode of domination in which ‘people are partially or wholly deprived of 
basic liberties’108 and in which, furthermore, their interactions are marked by 
‘profound asymmetries’,109  which are ‘maintained or created by employing 
  
 
explicit violence – particularly (but not exclusively) physical violence’.110 The 
latter, by contrast, constitutes a mode of domination in which subjects are  
not only entitled but also encouraged to benefit from their basic liberties and 
manage their lives, without allowing the underlying social asymmetries to  
be converted into unacceptable and preponderant antagonisms. Open and 
violent oppression tends to be more costly and less efficient than subtle and 
managerial regulation. 
If complex domination has emerged as the hegemonic model of 
management and administration in ‘contemporary democratic-capitalist 
societies’,111 it is essentially ‘the establishment of a new kind of relationship 
between institutions and critique and, in a sense, the incorporation of critique 
into the routines of social life which characterize these systems’.112 In short, in 
our societies, the widespread presence of critical processes within institutions 
makes it possible to attribute an unprecedented degree of legitimacy to 
domination. The more a social system succeeds in giving a voice to critique 
without running the risk of being undermined, the more critique becomes an 
affirmative force contributing to, rather than a negative counterforce moving 
away from, the reproduction of social domination. The Zeitgeist that lies at 
the centre of the new spirit of capitalism113 is based on the idea of ‘dominating 
by change’,114 thereby changing the very spirit of domination. It is because 
change is supposed to constitute ‘a source of energy’115 that the political forces 
cannot dominate without releasing the relentless dynamism of the productive 
forces. As a consequence, change is not only tolerated but even encouraged 
by the systems of managerial domination, at least to the extent that it does 
not jeopardize the fundamental normative parameters and implicit rules of 
the game. Functioning within the boundaries of this ‘new spirit’, discursive 
modes of justification are absorbed by effective modes of confirmation. A 
form of domination ‘that does not preclude change and is even […] exercised 
via the intermediary of change’116 is a mode of organization that aims to convert 
transformation into the principal driving force of its own reproduction. 
 
V. The Potential of Emancipation:              
 The Transformation of Social Life 
Once we critically consider the constitution and the functioning of different 
regimes of domination, the question that poses itself is the following: what  
is the place of  emancipation within systems of  complex domination? If   
one admits that social change is not the exclusive privilege of collective 
forces that insist upon the possibility of emancipation through processes of 
transformation, and if, moreover, one recognizes that social change – far 
from   being   reducible   to   an   accidental   development   or  a   historical 
  
 
deviation – constitutes an integral element and a crucial driving force of 
political regimes based on managerial domination, then how, and according 
to what criteria, is it possible to distinguish between transformative processes 
oriented towards emancipation and reproductive mechanisms that remain 
trapped in the logic of domination? 
Boltanski’s answer to this question is at once simple and complex. It is 
simple because, ultimately, the transformative processes oriented towards 
emancipation are characterized by the effort to promote the ‘critical project 
of a reduction in the privileges’117 of dominant social groups. At the same time, 
it is extremely complex because no emancipatory process can completely 
rise above the logic of domination, for behind every discursive process of 
justification lurks the affirmative suspicion of confirmation. On this account, 
every empowering human practice reminds us,  simultaneously,  of  the  
solid fragility of the justified and of the fragile solidity of the confirmed. 
Everything that appears justified requires confirmation, since, in principle, 
its validity can be repudiated. Analogously, everything that appears 
confirmed requires justification, since, in principle, its legitimacy can be 
undermined. 
Hence, it seems that a ‘radical transformation of the relationship between 
instances of confirmation and critical instances’118 cannot be dissociated from 
the political challenge to contribute to ‘a better distribution of capacities for 
action’:119 irrespective of which anthropological capacity may be considered 
as the most important one for processes of emancipation – our reflexive, 
critical, and moral competences or our projective, cooperative, and creative 
faculties – and regardless of which particular test (épreuve) may be conceived 
of as the most crucial one for processes of justification – truth tests, reality 
tests, or existential tests120 –, ‘the closure of reality on itself that discourages 
critique’121 needs to be inverted through the opening of society on itself that 
stimulates critique. To the extent that ‘institutions are indispensable’122 for the 
immersive and intuitive organization of socialization processes, critique is 
essential for the reflexive and discursive coordination of different forms of 
action. 
‘To recognize the presence of hermeneutic contradiction at the heart of 
social life would mean not only accepting the factual character of institutions – that 
is to say, the fact that they are made’,123 but, in addition, facing up to the 
normativity of actions – that is, to the fact that they are value-laden. The ‘relationship 
between critical instances and institutional instances’124 is central to social life, 
because the dialectical opening that is brought about by the dynamic interplay 
between justification and confirmation – and, thus, between problematization 
and acceptance, as well as between negation and affirmation – is crucial to all 
forms of socialization. 
  
 
Critical Reflections: Weaknesses and Limitations 
(I) Critical Theory: Given that he conceives of his own approach as a 
‘pragmatic’ one, it comes as no surprise that Boltanski fails to provide solid 
normative foundations for his conception of sociology in general and for his 
conception of critique in particular. Without a doubt, Boltanski is to be 
applauded for seeking to locate the normative resources of  critical theory   
in everyday social practices,  rather  than  in  the  intellectual  ivory  towers 
of armchair philosophy. Nonetheless, due to the contextualist assumptions 
underlying his notion of social criticism, his account of normativity remains 
remarkably vague. He presupposes – and, in his empirical studies, aims to 
demonstrate – that ordinary actors are equipped with the discursive ability  
to make judgements about themselves and about their environment. Yet, his 
anthropological optimism, which suggests that a reflexive engagement with 
the world is part and parcel of what it means to be human, fails to examine 
the species-constitutive roots of this ‘critical capacity’. 
Some commentators claim that, ever since Habermas’s announcement    
of a ‘paradigm shift’,125 critical theory has entered a midlife crisis;126 one  
may add that, without Habermas’s ‘linguistic turn’, critical theory would 
never have grown up in the first place. Critical theory without normative 
foundations is tantamount to social practice without access to material and 
symbolic resources. Unlike Boltanski, Habermas seeks to locate the normative 
foundations of critical theory in the rational foundations of language. From 
this perspective, our critical capacity is embedded in our linguistic competence. 
To be exact, our critical capacity is derived from (a) our assertive ability to 
make representational statements about the world, (b) our normative ability to 
coordinate our actions with other human beings in meaningful and morally 
justifiable ways, (c) our expressive ability to make our thoughts, judgements, 
and feelings known to others, and (d) our communicative ability to reach mutual 
understanding or, if necessary, discursively substantiated agreements with our 
interlocutors. 
Boltanski’s writings, by contrast, are based on the tacit presupposition 
that our critical capacity is somewhat ‘naturally’ embedded in our rational 
faculties.127 This unjustified presupposition prevents him from  shedding  
light on the species-constitutive resources that allow for the establishment of a 
reflexive grasp of reality and a discursive engagement with society. We may 
all agree that human beings, unlike other creatures, are potentially critical 
entities. Nevertheless, we need to identify the predispositional resources that 
allow for the development of critical capacity, if we seek to provide defensible 
normative, rather than metaphysical, grounds on which to justify the very idea 
of critical theory. 
  
 
(II) Institutions: Boltanski’s conception of institutions is flawed in three 
respects. 
(a) Terminological vagueness: Considering that Boltanski attaches great 
importance to the concept of institution in his study, it is hardly excusable that 
he fails to provide his readers with a clear and concise definition of this term. 
Given the absence of such a definition, his account of institutions, although 
it is theoretically challenging, remains conceptually imprecise and analytically 
convoluted. 
(b) Discursive justification: The aforementioned lack of conceptual 
accuracy and methodical rigour is reflected in the fact that Boltanski fails 
to acknowledge that some of the – presumably distinctive – characteristics 
that he attributes to ‘institutions’, notably their organizing and bonding 
functions, are crucial to other key sociological variables, such as social 
structures, cultural norms, and ritualized practices. Surely, Boltanski is right 
to insist that one of the vital anthropological functions of institutions is to 
guarantee both the material and the symbolic organization of the social 
world. Yet, he does not face up to the fact that various other – non- 
institutional – sociological variables also enable human agents to confront 
the intrinsic complexity and uncertainty of  their  existence  and,  hence, 
also represent invaluable sources of individual and collective identity, 
interactional predictability, and ontological security. In other words,  he 
does not succeed in putting his finger on the indispensable and irreplaceable 
functions of institutions – that is, on the essential anthropological functions 
that only institutions can fulfil. 
(c) Sociological analysis: Perhaps most significantly, Boltanski fails to 
identify evidence-based criteria that permit us to prove the actual existence of 
institutional realities. Given that, notably in highly differentiated societies, 
various interactional realms overlap, it is far from obvious what criteria should 
be used to define the boundaries of an institutional setting. More specifically, 
what is missing from Boltanski’s interpretation of institutions is a critical 
engagement with the following question: Does the preponderance of a particular 
institutional realm depend primarily on objective factors (e.g. structural 
circumstances), intersubjective factors (e.g. relational arrangements), subjective 
factors (e.g. cognitive projections), or on a combination of these elements? 
Boltanskian sociologists have a major task on their hands when seeking to 
provide evidence-based parameters for a non-reductive study of institutions. 
Without such criteria, both philosophical and sociological approaches to 
institutions remain purely speculative and largely rhetorical. Boltanski’s 
convoluted account of institutions may create an imaginative reality of 




(III) Critique: Another problematic aspect of this book is its author’s analysis 
of the nature of critique. To be sure, Boltanski is right to remind us of the fact 
that the distinction between ‘ordinary critique’ and ‘scientific critique’ is not 
as clear-cut as it may appear at first sight. Challenging the epistemological 
assumptions underlying the writings of Marxist, Durkheimian, and 
Bourdieusian thinkers, he makes a convincing case for the view that critique 
is a socio-ontological capacity of ordinary actors, rather than a professional 
privilege monopolized by reflexive scientists. It is disconcerting, however, 
that – despite the central importance that the author attaches to this concept, 
as is most bluntly conveyed in the book’s title – Boltanski does not offer a 
systematic examination of the relationship between ordinary and scientific 
forms of critique. 
In essence, we can distinguish three possible positions on this matter: 
 
(a) Scientific critique is superior to ordinary critique, because the underlying structural 
mechanisms and causalities of both the natural world and the social world 
escape people’s common-sense understanding of reality. 
(b) Ordinary critique is superior to scientific critique, because the authenticity of 
subjective and intersubjective experiences, derived from actors’ bodily 
involvement in the natural world and the social world, escapes conceptually 
sophisticated and methodically detached explanations of reality. 
(c) Both scientific critique and ordinary critique are legitimate and potentially insightful; 
their epistemic value depends on the kind of knowledge one seeks to 
produce, because the search for cognitive validity always takes place from 
a particular position in, and in relation to specific aspects of, reality. In 
other words, the point is not to oppose but to cross-fertilize scientific and 
ordinary ways of engaging with the world. 
 
It is one of Boltanski’s major achievements to have drawn attention to the 
sociological significance of everyday disputes, notably with regard to their 
pivotal role in the normative construction, and constant negotiation, of social 
arrangements. What he has failed to provide, however, is a systematic account 
of the epistemological reasons why scientific knowledge and ordinary knowledge 
are not as far apart as they may seem at first glance. Let us reflect upon these 
reasons, in order to illustrate their importance for Boltanski’s project. 
(a) The epistemic limitations of scientific knowledge: In order to defend the 
epistemic worth of scientific knowledge, one may contend that it contains 
three constitutive features: first, positivity, derived from the reliability of 
experience-based knowledge; second, objectivity, founded on the possibility 
of value-free knowledge; and, third, universality, expressed in the validity of 
context-transcending knowledge. Arguably, Bourdieu’s insistence upon the 
  
 
scientificity of sociology rests on his confidence in the positivity, objectivity, and 
universality of compelling knowledge claims. What those who defend this view 
fail to take into consideration, however, are the roles of linguisticality, subjectivity, 
and relativity in the normative construction of scientific knowledge. Given that 
every scientific approach to society is conceivable only as a linguistically mediated 
relation to reality, the reliability of experience-based knowledge is contingent 
upon the representational capacity of language. Since every scientific 
explanation rests upon a subjectively formulated interpretation of the world, 
the possibility of epistemic value-freeness is undermined by the omnipresent 
reality of positionally structured forms of value-ladenness. If every scientific 
generalization about the world can assert epistemic authority only insofar as 
it recognizes the contextually contingent relativity of all claims to representational 
accuracy, then the forcefulness of discursive claims to universal validity hinges 
upon the spatio-temporally constituted arbitrariness of social legitimacy. In 
short, the epistemic ideal of scientificity cannot rise above the social constraints 
of linguistically mediated, subjectively mobilized, and contextually anchored 
forms of normativity.128 
(b) The epistemic power of ordinary knowledge: In order to defend the epistemic 
worth of ordinary knowledge, we need to do justice to the cognitive capacities 
of social actors: (i) as representational beings, we are able to produce descriptive 
knowledge; (ii) as analytical beings, we construct systematic knowledge; (iii) 
as reflexive beings, we are capable of developing explanatory knowledge; (iv) 
as moral beings, we generate normative knowledge; (v) as rational beings, we 
participate in the exchange of discursive knowledge; (vi) as learning beings, we 
build on cumulative knowledge; and (vii) as projective beings, we can even make 
assumptions about the future on the basis of predictive knowledge. Rather than 
regarding these cognitive capacities as an epistemic privilege of scientists and 
experts, we need to recognize that they are built into the human condition. 
(c) Since the starting point of Boltanski’s entire project is to move away 
from a clear-cut distinction between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific 
knowledge’, and thereby reject the allegedly fatalistic nature of Bourdieu’s 
critical sociology, it is barely justifiable that he fails to provide a systematic 
epistemological framework on which to base his pragmatic sociology of critique. 
Put bluntly, there is no comprehensive sociology of critique without an 
analytical philosophy of epistemic capacities. 
 
(IV) Domination: One of the most insightful aspects of Boltanski’s analysis of 
social domination is the author’s insistence upon the elastic, adaptable, and 
integrative power of advanced capitalist systems. This is not to suggest that 
Boltanski disregards the dehumanizing, destructive, and exploitative 
dimensions of capitalism.  Rather, this means that, in opposition to one-sided 
  
 
views of capitalist formations, which conceive of market-driven societies 
merely as repressive ‘systems of enclosure’, Boltanski takes one of Marx’s 
principal theoretical concerns seriously: the vigorous, pioneering, and 
productive nature of capitalism. In fact, considering the rapid development of 
the productive forces over the past two centuries, one may come to the cynical 
conclusion that capitalism is capable of mobilizing the purposive, cooperative, 
creative, and species-constitutive potential of meaningful activity – 
epitomized in concrete labour – more successfully than any other hitherto 
existing economic system. The systemic capacity to achieve precisely this has 
been pertinently examined, by the author himself, in terms of the ‘new spirit 
of capitalism’.129 As convincingly argued by Boltanski, under the normative 
parameters of this ‘new spirit’, social actors – that is, political and economic 
elites ‘from above’, as much as ordinary people ‘from below’ – are not only 
allowed but also expected to mobilize the empowering resources inherent in 
their critical, reflexive, and productive capacities. The key ingredients of this 
‘new spirit’ – such as ‘initiative’, ‘creativity’, ‘imagination’, ‘transparency’, 
‘commitment’, ‘openness’, ‘dialogue’, and ‘team work’ – provide capitalist 
forms of domination not only with systemic elasticity and adaptability, but also 
with an unprecedented degree of ideological legitimacy. As a consequence, 
capitalism is now widely perceived as the only – viable and acceptable – game 
in town – that is, as the hegemonic mode of production almost everywhere in 
the world.130 
One may  of course  question  the  originality  of  Boltanski’s  explanatory 
framework by pointing to the fact that, already during the early days of 
modernity, classical social and economic theorists – notably Smith, Ricardo, 
Marx, Weber, and Polanyi – characterized capitalism as the most dynamic 
economic system in the history of humankind. The more significant problem 
arising from Boltanski’s analysis, however, concerns another issue: his lack 
of attention to the polycentric constitution of power relations in differentiated 
societies. Despite his emphasis on the dynamic and flexible nature of complex 
systems of domination, Boltanski downplays the fact that capitalist societies 
are internally divided by sociological determinants, such as class, gender, 
ethnicity, religion, age, and ability. In Anglo-Saxon sociology, the term 
‘intersectionality’ is – rightly or wrongly – used to account for the internal 
complexity of polycentric social settings and identities. In order to face up  
to the intricacy of power relations in highly differentiated societies, we need 
to examine not only the ‘new spirit of capitalism’, but also the continuing 
presence of other sources of both structural and ideological domination, such 
as ethnocentrism, racism, sexism, ageism, and ableism. Boltanski’s failure to 
attribute equal, or at least a similar, amount of importance to other major 
sources of social power is indicative of the fact that,  despite his scepticism 
  
 
towards determinist approaches in the social sciences, his own conception  
of domination suffers from residual economic reductionism, according to 
which we can distinguish between a ‘main contradiction’ (Hauptwiderspruch) 
and ‘subordinate contradictions’ (Nebenwidersprüche), the latter representing 
derivative manifestations of the former. It is time to explore the ‘new spirits’ 
of other ‘-isms’. 
 
(V) Emancipation: One of the most promising thematic aspects of On 
Critique is at the same time one of its weakest elements: Boltanski’s analysis 
of human emancipation. Indeed, this issue ties in with another problematic 
aspect of  this book, which may strike Anglo-Saxon readers particularly:   
the author’s tendency to make relatively simple points in an unnecessarily 
complicated, and at times convoluted, language. This issue is especially 
obvious when considering Boltanski’s questionable, and arguably reductive, 
account of emancipatory processes. As explained above, the author conceives 
of  emancipatory processes, essentially,  as social practices that contribute   
to ‘a reduction in the privileges’,131 ‘a better distribution of capacities for 
action’,132 and the realization of actors’ critical capacities  mobilized  in  
order to oppose ‘the closure of reality on itself that discourages critique’.133 
Unfortunately, this broad conception of emancipation, which is founded on 
belief in the empowering capacities of ordinary people, is politically so elastic 
that not only anarchists, communists, and socialists but also social democrats, 
liberals, and even neo-conservatives would be happy to endorse it. Boltanski’s 
nebulous approach to emancipation, which fails to capture the qualitative 
specificity of universally empowering social practices, is symptomatic of the 
author’s inability to identify viable forms of action and reflection capable of 
substantially undermining the hegemonic logic underlying systems of social 
domination. Certainly, Boltanski is right to resist the temptation to develop 
utopian blueprints. If, however, the normative task of critical theory is reduced 
to uncovering the ‘hermeneutic contradictions’ inherent in established power 
relations without reflecting in detail on the conditions enabling the creation of 
viable alternatives, then it will remain trapped in the symbolic and material 
parameters of the historical horizon it seeks to overcome. 
Moreover, one may wonder to what extent Boltanski’s conception of 
emancipation remains trapped in a rationalist view of the social, which is 
concerned primarily with actors’ cognitive and critical capacities, rather than 
with their bodily constitution and non-rational ways of engaging with the 
world. If there is one important lesson that Boltanski can learn from Bourdieu, 
it is the insight that there can be no comprehensive sociology of emancipation 
without a critical sociology of the body. The latter escapes the agenda of merely 
rationalist approaches to individual and social emancipation.  Thus, it is ironic 
  
 
that, although the whole point of Boltanski’s pragmatic project is to take 
ordinary actors and their various self-empowering capacities seriously, it remains 
caught up in the tradition of mainstream theories of domination in conceiving 
of the subject’s rational and critical capacities as the motor of emancipatory 
social processes. Boltanski’s book is a major contribution to the literature and 
makes a convincing case for regarding critical theory as a worthwhile project, 
whose normative foundations are to be located in ordinary processes of action 
and reflection. If, however, we are willing to accept that emancipatory social 
practices are not limited to discursive processes of critique and justification,  
it must be the task of critical theory to break out of the rationalist straitjacket 
that prevents it from understanding that self-enlightenment is a necessary but 
insufficient condition for human emancipation. 
Finally, despite Boltanski’s announcement that one of the chief objectives 
of this book is to contribute to the reconciliation between ‘critical sociology’ 
and the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, it lacks a systematic overview of 
the key points of convergence, divergence, and possible integration between these 
two approaches. Undoubtedly, Boltanski’s aim to overcome both personal 
and intellectual differences with his ‘academic father’, and thereby provide 
the basis for a constructive dialogue between their respective approaches,    
is to be welcomed. It is striking, though, that Boltanski’s attempt to open 
such a fruitful conversation between the two accounts remains remarkably 
vague and unsystematic. As I have tried to demonstrate in another study,134 
the two approaches, despite the considerable differences that exist between 
the respective theoretical frameworks they have developed, are far from 
incommensurable. An in-depth comparison between Bourdieu and Boltanski 
illustrates that the two thinkers share various theoretical concerns and, more 
importantly, that they converge on several normative positions, notably in 
relation to their critique of social domination and their insistence upon the 
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maniaque de la cohérence’ (italics in original).] 
103 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 119). [Boltanski (2009: 179): ‘différents régimes politiques se 
distinguent par le rôle qu’ils accordent à la critique face au pouvoir des institutions’.] 
104 See Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 124–126). [See Boltanski (2009: 186–190).] 
105 See Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127–129). [See Boltanski (2009: 190–193).] 
106 It should be noted that Boltanski does not use this term in On Critique. 
107 See Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127–129). [See Boltanski (2009: 190–193).] 
108 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 124). [Boltanski (2009: 186): ‘les personnes sont partiellement 
ou complètement privées des libertés élémentaires’.] 
109 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 125). [Boltanski (2009: 186): ‘profondes asymétries’.] 
110 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 124). [Boltanski (2009: 186): ‘maintenues ou créées en mettant 
en œuvre une violence directe, bien que non exclusivement physique’.] 
111 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127; italics in original). [Boltanski (2009: 190): ‘sociétés 
capitalistes-démocratiques contemporaines’ (italics in original).] 
112 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127; translation modified). [Boltanski (2009: 191): ‘l’instauration 
d’un nouveau genre de relation entre institutions et critique et, en quelque sorte, 
l’incorporation de celle-ci aux routines de la vie sociale qui caractérisent ces dispositifs’.] 
On the role of critique in complex societies, see also Susen (2010a) and Susen (2010b). 
  
 
113 See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). 
114 See Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 129; italics in original). [See Boltanski (2009: 193): ‘dominer 
par le changement’ (italics in original).] 
115   Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 129). [Boltanski (2009: 193): ‘source d’énergie’.] 
116 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 127; italics in original). [Boltanski (2009: 191): ‘qui n’exclue 
pas le changement et même […] qui s’exerce par l’intermédiaire du changement’ (italics in 
original).] 
117 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 154; italics added). [Boltanski (2009: 228): ‘projet critique 
d’une diminution des privilèges’ (italics added).] 
118 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 155). [Boltanski (2009: 229): ‘transformation radicale de la 
relation entre instances de confirmation et instances critiques’.] 
119 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 156). [Boltanski (2009: 231): ‘une meilleure distribution des 
capacités d’action’.] 
120 See ibid. 
121 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 156; italics added). [Boltanski (2009: 231): ‘la clôture de la 
réalité sur elle-même qui décourage la critique’ (italics added).] 
122 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 157). [Boltanski (2009: 232): ‘les institutions sont indispensables’ 
(italics added).] 
123 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 157) (‘made’ italicized in original; ‘factual character of institutions’ 
not italicized in original). [Boltanski (2009: 233): ‘Reconnaître la présence de la 
contradiction herméneutique au cœur de la vie sociale reviendrait non seulement      
à admettre la factualité des institutions, c’est-à-dire le fait qu’elles sont faites […]’ (‘faites’ 
italicized in original; ‘factualité des institutions’ not italicized in original).] 
124 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 158). [Boltanski (2009: 233): ‘relation entre les instances 
critiques et les instances institutionnelles’.] 
125 See, for example: Habermas (1981a); Habermas (1981b); Habermas (1984); Habermas 
(2001). 
126 On this point, see, for instance: Bolte (1989); Honneth and Joas (1986); Moritz (1992); 
Rademacher (1993); Steinhoff (2001). 
127 To be sure, Boltanski conceives of ‘critical capacity’ as a species-constitutive 
competence. On this point, see, for example: Boltanski (1990a); Boltanski (1990b); 
Boltanski (1993); Boltanski (1998); Boltanski (1999–2000); Boltanski (2002); Boltanski 
(2009); Boltanski and Honneth (2009); Boltanski, Rennes, and Susen (2010); Boltanski 
and Thévenot (1991); Boltanski and Thévenot (1999); Boltanski and Thévenot (2000). 
Unlike thinkers such as Habermas, however, Boltanski fails to elucidate the socio- 
ontological relationship between critical capacity and linguistic rationality. 
128 On this point, see Susen (2011a: 72–73). 
129 See Boltanski and Chiapello (1999). On this point, see also, for instance: Bidet (2002); 
Chiapello and Fairclough (2002); Fairclough (2002); Gadrey, Hatchuel, Boltanski, and 
Chiapello (2001); Turner (2007). 
130 On this point, see Susen (2012). 
131 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 154) (‘reduction in the privileges’ italicized in original). [Boltanski 
(2009: 228): ‘une diminution des privilèges’ (‘diminution des privilèges’ italicized in original).] 
132 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 156). [Boltanski (2009: 231): ‘une meilleure distribution des 
capacités d’action’.] 
133 Boltanski (2011 [2009]: 156). [Boltanski (2009: 231): ‘la clôture de la réalité sur elle- 
même qui décourage la critique’.] 
134  Susen (2014). 
  
 
135   It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to offer a detailed analysis of the key points 
of convergence, divergence, and possible integration between Bourdieu’s ‘critical 
sociology’ and Boltanski’s ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’. For a Grundriß of the main 
elements of this project, see Susen (2014). 
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